I. INTRODUCTION
"It is easy to forget that important Supreme Court cases involve people; it is even easier to forget they are rooted in particular places." Zuni and Gallup-McKinley are both located on or near tax-exempt American Indian reservations. As such, the districts are eligible to receive Impact Aid-federal funding meant to ensure that school districts are not penalized for their inability to raise revenue for education through property taxes. 3 If, however, the Department of Education determines that a state's school finance system equally distributes resources to all students, the state may offset state funding to impacted districts by the KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 amount each district receives in Impact Aid. 4 Such was the case for the Zuni and Gallup-McKinley school districts.
Zuni and Gallup-McKinley challenged the Secretary of Education's use of a formula to determine that New Mexico was equalized. The statutory interpretation that led to the Secretary's choice of formula was subject to Chevron review. 5 An integral element of Chevron review is to ensure that the Secretary's interpretation, and its effects, are permissible in light of congressional intent. 6 The Court's compulsion, however, to decide "who gets to decide" under Chevron review eclipsed any analysis of the consequences of the Secretary's interpretation and formula choice. As a result, the two districts are now forced to choose between school buildings with running water and hiring experienced teachers able to address the unique learning needs of their Native American students. Although this is the kind of penalty Congress sought to avoid through Impact Aid, the Court ignored the problem altogether. The Court's application of Chevron review in Zuni was too constraining, and produced an outcome misaligned with congressional intent.
Part II provides the historical context for the case, including a discussion of the challenges inherent in efforts to equalize financial resources in education, New Mexico's efforts to equalize funding within the state, and the federal government's role in ensuring school finance equity through the Impact Aid program. Part II also briefly summarizes the procedural history of the case. Parts III and IV explain Chevron review and how the Court applied Chevron review to the case. Part V analyzes both the constraining nature of Chevron review in the case, and the failure of Chevron review to assist the Court in determining whether agency interpretation was permissible in light of congressional intent and agency expertise. Part V also resurrects calls for replacement of Chevron step two with arbitrary and capricious "hard-look" review. This change would have ensured that the Court considered relevant policy implications and the practical consequences of the Department's interpretation when determining whether to extend deference to the Secretary's decision which had such significant adverse consequences for Native American schoolchildren in New Mexico. 
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A. School Finance Equity
The dispute about the equity of New Mexico's school finance system and the appropriateness of the Secretary's equalization formula is a recent development in the long history of battles regarding education and school finance equity. 7 Although the details of school finance systems vary from state to state, most states generally delegate responsibility for raising revenue to individual districts. 8 A district's ability to raise revenue for its schools is usually determined by the wealth of its tax base. Thus, disparities in property wealth yield disparities in educational funding. The role of the state is typically as a partner, ensuring minimum education needs are met.
States essentially guarantee inequalities in funding by allowing districts to raise revenue locally for education, particularly when a state has not adopted an equalization program. As such, some school districts become "enclaves of affluence," while other districts are left with minimal fiscal strength. 9 These enclaves have become adept at convincing legislatures that their advantage is justified, leading some scholars to note that the public school system in the United States is not public, but rather "quasi-public" or "quasi-private." 10 In this quasipublic system, the interests of wealthier districts are insulated, geographically defined, and protected by state legislatures that refuse to enact school funding programs to equalize resources.
11
State court challenges to education financing systems that perpetuate these inequalities proliferated in the aftermath of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 12 where the Court held that disparities caused by school systems that relied on property taxes were not violations of the United States Constitution because education is not a fundamental right. 13 At the heart of these challenges is concern for the ways in which education finance resources are distributed, and the relationship between spending and student achievement. Several equity principles can be utilized when assessing the distribution of resources, including horizontal equity, vertical equity, and adequacy. Horizontal equity provides that students who are alike should be treated alike, and requires that all students receive equal shares of local and state revenue per pupil. 14 Several statistics assess the level of horizontal equity within a state, including the federal range ratio. 15 The federal range ratio, also referred to as a restricted range ratio, is the formula included in the text of the Impact Aid statute. 16 Vertical equity accounts for the reality that some students need or deserve more services than others, and that providing more services requires more funding. 17 Accordingly, achieving vertical equity requires identifying characteristics that can be used as a basis for distributing additional resources to certain students, or the programs and school districts that educate those students. 18 Student characteristics that justify additional funding include physical or mental disabilities, educational disadvantages stemming from a low-income background, or limited English proficiency. 19 District characteristics that justify additional funding might include, for example, unique transportation costs associated with very large, or very small, districts. 20 School program characteristics, such as vocational programs or magnet schools, may also warrant additional resources. 21 Finally, adequacy is defined as "the provision of a set of strategies, programs, curriculum, and instruction, with appropriate adjustments for special-needs students, districts, and schools, and their full financing, that is sufficient to teach students to high standards." 22 To the extent that adequacy addresses how much is required to educate students based on each student's individual need, adequacy can be partially addressed 14 
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through a combination of horizontal and vertical equity. 23 At the same time, adequacy also addresses the relationship between educational inputs and educational outputs. Educational inputs include "programs, curriculum, and instruction that are sufficient to teach students to high standards," while outputs include "the measurement of the achievement that results." 24 Considering the link between equity and adequacy is integral to ensuring equal educational opportunities for all students. 25 The concept of adequacy, however, has not been without debate. Some have argued that there is no consistent relationship between money input and achievement output, and that to obtain more money for education is simply "throwing good money after bad." 26 This "production-function" 27 critique of school finance has its origins in the Coleman report, 28 which was interpreted as indicating that schools have little influence on student achievement independent of family background and social context.
29
The production-function model, however, has been criticized as inadequate when applied to the education system. 30 Moreover, methodological flaws in the research underlying the Coleman report have rendered the report's conclusions a result of flawed 23 . The two concepts of adequacy and equity are often considered interchangeable, particularly in school finance reform litigation where remedies can be justified based on either concept. See Underwood, supra note 7, at 513−19 (equating adequacy and vertical equity). But see William The production-function model was first developed and applied to industry. Problems with applying the model to education include confusion about the relevant unit of production (individual pupil, classroom, school, or school district), and whether the chosen unit of production is "maximizing academic achievement or some other output." Id. at 356. Moreover, studies that apply the model do not identify an underlying theory of learning that defines the relationship between school inputs and academic achievement. Id. For example, the studies all "assume that teacher inputs can be measured by teacher characteristics," including education, experience and aptitude, and ignore the way in which these characteristics are actually implicated in the teaching-learning process.
Id analysis, and an inaccurate reflection of the "underlying behavioral reality." 31 Since then, several production-function studies addressed the flaws inherent when the model is applied to education, and found: (1) "[i]f family income [cannot] be changed, improvement in school outputs require[s] dramatic increases in inputs or significant changes in resource combinations;" (2) schools are incapable of improving the life outcomes of minorities without changing inefficiencies in expenditures for teacher experience and additional education; and (3) "money is important in producing higher student test scores when it purchases teachers with strong literacy skills, reduces class size to eighteen students per teacher, retains experienced teachers, and increases the number of teachers with advanced degrees." 32 These conclusions indicate that school finance is linked to student academic achievement.
Despite the ongoing debate, it is obvious to most that, at the very minimum, money can buy educational resources like instructional materials and equipment, new facilities, and increases in the number of highly trained teachers. It is also clear that communities, wealthy and poor alike, value the opportunities that additional money can buy. Indeed, Coons, Clune and Sugarman stated it best when they wrote:
We regard the fierce resistance by rich districts to reform as adequate testimonial to the relevance of money. Whatever it is that money may be thought to contribute to the education of children, that commodity is something highly prized by those who enjoy the greatest measure of it. If money is inadequate to improve education, the residents of poor districts should at least have an equal opportunity to be disappointed by its failure. 33 If one agrees that differences in funding do affect the quality of education, it is clear that inequalities in the resources of school districts produce a wide range of educational opportunities afforded to students. It is a question of basic fairness to ensure that students are not penalized in terms of their education just because they are born into a family that is neither wealthy nor fortunate enough to live in a wealthy district. This issue, and the responsibility of a state to address it, is at the heart of the Zuni case. 
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B. New Mexico and School Finance Equity
New Mexico depends on local property taxes to fund public school education. Like most states that depend on local taxes to fund public schools, differences in wealth among New Mexico's local education agencies (LEAs) 34 have led to inequity in school funding. New Mexico has faced considerable challenges in its effort to address this inequity, including differences in the depth of district tax bases, poverty levels, and enrollment figures.
Overall, New Mexico ranks forty-eighth out of fifty states in per capita personal income, with 23.78% of public school age children living in poverty. 35 The percent of school-age children living in poverty in the Los Alamos Public School District, however, is a considerably lower 2.53%. 36 In contrast, the percentage of school-age children living in poverty in Zuni Public School District is 48.22%; the percentage in Gallup-McKinley Public School District is 37.11%. 37 In forty-nine of New Mexico's eighty-nine LEAs, the percentage is 25% or higher; twenty-six LEAs have percentages over 30%, and seven LEAs have percentages over 40%.
38
Variations in the number of students enrolled in schools across the state have also impeded efforts to equalize funding. Due to economies of scale, education costs may be higher in small districts, and research suggests that "size economies that reduce costs by more than one dollar per pupil do exist up to but not beyond 200 pupils." 39 The largest school district in New Mexico is Albuquerque Public Schools, with 94,566 students. 40 The smallest school district is the Mosquero district, with a population of fifty students. 41 34. Throughout this article the terms "local education agencies" and "school districts" are used interchangeably.
35 Despite these obstacles, New Mexico has remained committed to its diverse student population, 42 and to providing educational services to students with differing needs. 43 In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 44 a group of plaintiffs in New Mexico filed a lawsuit alleging that the state's education finance system, in which school funding expenditures varied widely based on the wealth of each school district, was in violation of New Mexico's constitution. 45 The case settled before trial when New Mexico implemented the 1974 Public School Finance Act, which required the state to fund the operational costs of all school districts. 46 The Act's funding formula is based on a model developed by the National Education Finance Project in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 47 and includes a "state equalization guarantee distribution."
48
The distribution is "that amount of money distributed to each school district to ensure that the school district's operating revenue, including its local and federal revenues . . . is at least equal to the school district's program cost."
49 "Program cost" is defined as the amount of money determined under New Mexico's funding formula "to be necessary for a given district with a particular configuration of students and educational programs to provide educational services."
50
The funding formula determines each district's program cost by using cost differentials to calculate the price associated with providing educational services to students with differing needs. 51 The inclusion of these cost differentials 42 . 31.1% of public-school students in the state are classified as "Anglo;" 54% are classified as Hispanic; 11.1% are classified as Native American; 2.5% are classified as Black; and 1.3% are classified as Asian. N.M. PUB. EDUC. DEP'T, PERCENT OF 
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seeks to address vertical equity. The formula also makes adjustments for several other factors, including a district's "training and experience index," 52 the number of students served in nonprofit special education institutions, and the unique challenges faced by small, rural, or newly created school districts.
53
The state equalization guarantee distributions are disbursed from the Public School Fund. 54 When allocating the money, the state reduces its distribution to a particular district by an amount equal to 75% of what that district was independently able to raise through taxes. 55 Funds are distributed in a non-categorical manner, and are not earmarked for specific programs.
56 School districts are allowed to spend their funding according to local priorities as long as they stay within statutory guidelines.
57
The wealthiest school district in New Mexico enjoys per-pupil funding of $6520, while the poorest district in the state has per-pupil funding of $2672-a difference of 144%. 58 Outliers will always exist, however, because political concerns often make it unfeasible to eliminate all disparity by completely transferring the resources of one community to another. 59 Indeed, when devising a school finance formula to equitably fund schools throughout the state, New Mexico sought to "equalize educational opportunity at the highest possible revenue level while minimizing the financial loss to the richest districts." 60 Accordingly, despite the lingering outliers, New Mexico is lauded as having one of the most equalized funding formulas in the nation. 61 The state's equalization guarantee distribution accounts for more than 90% of 52. BALL & GARCIA, supra note 50, at 5. A district's training and experience index is based on the academic classifications and the experience levels of teachers in the district. The Federal government has recognized the impediment that taxexempt federal lands, such as Indian reservations, can pose to an LEA's efforts to raise money for public schools through property taxes. Congress addressed this problem by enacting the Impact Aid program in 1950. 63 The program provides funding to those school districts with compromised ability to levy taxes in support of public schools due to the presence of tax-exempt federal property within the district.
64
The program also provides federal funds to local school districts to assist with the costs of providing "educational services to federally connected children." 65 "Federally connected children" are defined as those children whose parents are in the military, children who reside on Indian lands or federal property, and children whose parents are employed on federal property. When Congress amended the Impact Aid statute to allow states to consider Impact Aid payments as long as the state ensured that operational expenditures were equalized among LEAs, the job of determining whether a state was "equalized" was left to the Secretary of Education.
71 Accordingly, the Secretary promulgated regulations, the appendix of which outlined several steps for determining whether a state was equalized. First, LEAs within a state were to be ranked in order of per-pupil revenue.
72 Second, the per-pupil revenue of the highest and lowest ranked LEAs would be compared to determine whether expenditures were indeed equalized throughout the state.
73
If the disparity between the highest and lowest ranked LEAs was no more than 25%, the state would be considered equalized.
74
During the public notice and comment process, the Secretary expressed concern that outlier LEAs at the top and bottom of the ranked list would distort the true nature of a state's operational funding.
75
Commentators proposed various methods to help minimize the impact of outliers, including (1) excluding districts above the ninety-fifth and below the fifth percentiles based on the number of districts ranked, or (2) excluding schools above the ninety-fifth and below the fifth percentiles based on the number of pupils in each of the ranked school districts. The Secretary rejected the former suggestion and decided that percentile cut-offs would be based on the number of pupils rather than the number of school districts. 77 As justification, the Secretary noted that percentile cut-offs based on the number of districts would apply the disparity standard in an unfair and inconsistent manner among states.
78
In states with a small number of large districts, an exclusion based on the percentage of school districts might exclude a substantial percentage of the pupil population, resulting in a comparison that would not accurately reflect the experience of a significant portion of students in the state. 79 Conversely, in states with a large number of small districts, the same approach might exclude only an insignificant portion of the pupil population.
80
The Secretary's chosen formula was not without its own methodological infirmities. When applied to a state with a large number of small school districts, like New Mexico, an equalization formula that bases percentile cut-offs on student population will generally eliminate larger numbers of LEAs, making it more likely that disparities between school districts will be camouflaged. Despite this potential problem, the Secretary's formula was promulgated in 1976; the body of the regulation contained the permitted 25% disparity, whereas the equalization formula which addressed methodology was produced in an appendix.
81
The Impact Aid statute itself did not codify any of the equalization standards or identify an equalization methodology.
An example is illuminating for purposes of understanding exactly how the Secretary's formula is applied. In fiscal year 2000, New Mexico had 317,777 students, and eighty-nine school districts. 82 Those districts can be ranked in order of per-pupil expenditures. Mosquero district is ranked first, with a per-pupil revenue of $6520. 83 Des Moines district is ranked eighty-ninth, with a per-pupil revenue of $2672. 84 If the equalization formula based percentile cut-offs on the number of school districts ranked, the first five and the last five districts would be disregarded so as to identify the per-pupil revenue for the LEA that serves pupils at the ninety-fifth and fifth percentile of the number of 77 
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LEAs in the state. To determine disparity, the per-pupil revenue of the sixth-ranked Maxwell district, $3591, and the per-pupil revenue of the eighty-fourth ranked Gadsden district, $2829, would be compared.
85
Because $3591 exceeds $2829 by more than 25%, the state would be deemed un-equalized for purposes of Impact Aid. What the Secretary's equalization formula requires instead, however, is that the ninety-fifth and fifth percentiles be determined by reference to a district's student population. 86 The effect is to identify the per-pupil revenue for the LEA that serves pupils at the ninety-fifth and fifth percentiles of the student population in the state. Applied to New Mexico's eighty-nine LEAs, enough LEAs must be eliminated from the top of the ranking to account for 15,888 students, or as close to that figure as possible without going over. Similarly, enough LEAs have to be eliminated from the bottom of the ranking to account for 15,888 students, or as close to that figure as possible without going over. Under this formula, twenty-three LEAs are eliminated, and the per-pupil revenue of the eighteenth-ranked Penasco district, $3259, is compared to the per-pupil revenue of the eighty-third-ranked Hobbs district, $2848.
87
Because $3259 exceeds $2848 by only 14.43%, New Mexico is considered equalized for purposes of Impact Aid.
In 1994 Congress re-authorized Impact Aid. This time, the statute itself codified the standards for determining whether a state's educational funding is equalized. 88 The statute reads that a state is equalized if "the amount of per-pupil expenditure made by, or per-pupil revenues available to, the local educational agency in the State with the highest such per-pupil expenditures or revenues [does] not exceed the amount of such per-pupil expenditures made by, or per-pupil revenues available to, the local educational agency in the State with the lowest such expenditures or revenues by more than 25 percent." 89 The statute further states that LEAs above the ninety-fifth or below the fifth percentile in per-pupil expenditures should be disregarded for purposes of determining disparity. 90 Finally, when making determinations of equalization, the statute directs the Secretary to consider the additional costs a state incurs when providing education in unique school districts, such as those that 91 Unlike the previous statute, which left equalization formulas entirely up to the Secretary, the language of this statute spoke directly to how equalization was to be determined. It did not reference the weighted ranking methodology that the Secretary had employed for eighteen years.
In September of 1995, the Secretary promulgated regulations in furtherance of the re-authorization. Those regulations reflected the statute's mandate that districts be ranked by per-pupil expenditures, and that LEAs with per-pupil expenditures or revenues above the ninety-fifth or below the fifth percentile would be disregarded for purposes of determining disparity. 92 The regulations also, however, made reference to an appendix that outlined the "method for calculating the percentage of disparity." 93 This appendix essentially repeated the language from the 1976 appendix, and mandated that a weighted ranking based on the population of each school district in the state be made.
D. Background and Procedural History of Zuni
Zuni Public School District and Gallup-McKinley Public School District (collectively referred to as "Petitioners") challenged the Secretary's equalization formula. Petitioners also challenged the determination that New Mexico operates an equalized funding program which allows New Mexico to consider the Impact Aid received by both districts when determining state funding allocations. 94 The Zuni Public School District is located entirely within the Pueblo of Zuni Reservation, and has virtually no tax base. 95 
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A certification hearing to determine whether operational funding for public education in New Mexico was equalized for the 1999-2000 fiscal year was held in 1999. There, the Secretary of Education determined that New Mexico's funding scheme was equalized. 98 Petitioners sought a hearing before a U.S. Department of Education administrative law judge to challenge both the method used to make the determination, and the determination itself. The judge upheld the Secretary's determination that New Mexico's funding scheme was equalized. 99 Petitioners then appealed to the Secretary, who denied the appeal.
In The Chevron case involved a challenge to the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the meaning of the phrase "stationary source" as found in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. 105 In 1981, the agency conducted a rulemaking proceeding and revised its interpretation of "stationary source" to refer to an entire plant.
106 Referred to as the "bubble concept," 107 the effect was to allow a plant to increase pollution emissions from an individual pollution emitting device without triggering EPA intervention as long as net emissions for the plant were not increased as a whole.
108 A plant could achieve this by increasing emissions from an individual pollution emitting device, while simultaneously decreasing emissions from another device. 109 The D.C. Circuit determined that there was no clear definition of the phrase "stationary source" in the text or legislative history of the Clean Air Act. 110 The D.C. Circuit went on to independently evaluate the EPA's interpretation 111 and determined that the interpretation was inconsistent with the objectives of the Clean Air Act.
112
In reversing the D.C. Circuit, the Supreme Court established a twopart test for reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court 
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is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.
113
The Court further elaborated that gaps and ambiguities in statutes indicate an "implied" delegation 114 of interpretive authority.
115
Because of the two-part test it articulated, Chevron has been described as "one of very few defining cases . . . in American public law."
116
Chevron fundamentally impacted the relationship between courts and agencies in administrative law, despite the intention of the test's creators to issue a routine environmental law opinion.
117
If Congress has not directly spoken, a court using Chevron review defers to an agency's interpretation of a statute as long as the interpretation is a "permissible construction of the statute."
118 Courts have used various tests to determine what constitutes a "permissible construction," including examining whether an interpretation is consistent with a statute's plain language or meaning, 119 underlying congressional intent or purpose, 120 or legislative history.
121
Chevron review, however, also recognizes agency expertise and political accountability. 117. Ironically, scholars have noted that the Chevron court never intended for the case to so fundamentally impact the law of deference, and that papers of the late Justice Thurgood Marshall contain no evidence that any justice considered the case any more than a routine opinion in environmental law. Ronald M. Levin Christensen involved the validity of an opinion letter issued by the Department of Labor concerning compensatory time. The Court determined application of the Chevron framework was unwarranted because, similar to policy statements or enforcement guidelines, the letter lacked the force of law and could be distinguished from those interpretations arrived at after "formal adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking."
132
Mead further clarified the relationship between agency rulemaking and the processes used by agencies to interpret statutes. Deciding that a tariff ruling by the United States Custom Service was not entitled to Chevron deference, the Court explained that Chevron analysis was applicable when "it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."
133 A good indication of such delegation is congressional authorization to "engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed."
134 Mead also noted, however, that Chevron analysis might be applicable even when formal procedures were not employed by the agency. 135 Finally, Barnhart built upon the principle in Mead which suggested that Chevron analysis might be applicable even when an agency did not use formal procedures and the "agency's actions lacked the force of law." 136 In ruling that the Social Security Administration's initial use of less formal procedures to develop regulations did not preclude Chevron deference, the Court explained that Chevron deference would depend on the "interpretive method used and the nature of the question at issue." 137 Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer rejected a simple deference rule, and instead advocated for a case-by-case inquiry which would examine "the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time . . . ."
138
Taken together, the three cases suggest that the application of the Chevron framework, and the ultimate extension of Chevron deference, will depend on Congress' instructions in a particular statutory scheme. Although the "grant of authority to act with the force of law" is sufficient, it is not a necessary condition for a court to "find that Congress has granted an agency the power to interpret ambiguous" statutes. 139 The Secretary of Education is authorized by law to "make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations" in order to govern programs administered by the Department of Education and carry out functions vested in the Secretary by law. 140 At issue in Zuni was the Secretary's interpretation through regulation of the Impact Aid statute the Department is charged with administering. As such, Zuni involved the type of rulemaking through regulation which was recognized in Mead as warranting Chevron analysis. Although the Secretary declined to follow notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures when promulgating the regulations at issue, the APA's "good cause" exemption allows agencies to make rules that are binding and have the force of law, even without a notice-and-comment process. 141 In this case, the Secretary utilized the exemption. 142 Moreover, the Impact Aid Statute explicitly directs the Secretary of Education to determine whether a state has a program in effect that equalizes expenditures for public education, and if so, to certify that state's program as equalized.
143
Only then may a state offset their education funding to a district by the amount of Impact Aid received by 138. Id. 139. Sunstein, supra note 128, at 218. 140. 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-3 (2000) ("The Secretary, in order to carry out functions otherwise vested in the Secretary by law or by delegation of authority pursuant to law, and subject to limitations as may be otherwise imposed by law, is authorized to make, promulgate, issue, rescind, and amend rules and regulations governing the manner of operation of, and governing the applicable programs administered by, the Department."). 
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that district. These adjudications carry the force of law, as they are binding on the states. In this sense, the Secretary is engaging in the type of adjudication that was also recognized in Mead as warranting Chevron analysis.
In light of the rulemaking and adjudicatory nature of the Secretary's actions, the application of Chevron analysis to the Zuni case was appropriate. Accordingly, the Court's opinion focused on the two prongs of Chevron review: (1) whether Congress spoke directly to how equalization was to be determined in the Impact Aid Statute; and (2) assuming Congress was silent or ambiguous regarding equalization determinations, whether the Secretary's determination was a permissible and reasonable interpretation of the statute. 144 Application of Chevron review to the Zuni case was not simple, despite the doctrine's seemingly straightforward two-part test. Briefs filed in the Supreme Court, as well as oral argument, focused heavily on the first prong of Chevron: whether Congress had spoken directly to the method which must be used for purposes of determining whether a state operates an equalized education system. 145 Petitioners' brief argued that the explicit language used by Congress in the 1994 statute requires that the Secretary disregard LEAs with per-pupil expenditures or revenues above the ninety-fifth and below the fifth percentile of such expenditures in the state. 146 Accordingly, an equalization formula that requires a weighted ranking of LEAs based on population is in direct contradiction with congressional intent and is completely precluded by the language of the statute. 147 Petitioners pointed out that counsel for both the Department and New Mexico admitted to this conflict during the administrative hearing on the issue. 148 Petitioners also argued that even if Congress was not entirely clear, and the second step of Chevron review was warranted, traditional tools of statutory construction, including performing a "natural reading," considering "interpretive clues" from Congress, and viewing the statute in its "textual setting," all illustrate that as of 1994 Accordingly, every student in the state has a "per-pupil revenue" which must be accounted for in the equalization formula.
159
The rest of New Mexico's arguments were devoted to proving that the Secretary's interpretation was indeed permissible under step two of Chevron review, and made heavy use of legislative history and congressional intent analysis. New Mexico noted that the Secretary historically maintained three regulatory options under which a state could qualify as equalized, and that it was at the Secretary's request that Congress even altered the Impact Aid regulatory scheme in 1994. 160 In fact, the Secretary drafted what would become the language of the reenacted Impact Aid program, and that language suggested an equalization method would be placed in the appendix. 161 As such, despite the language of the statute, it would be illogical to believe that the Department was rejecting its own disparity test, or advocating that Congress adopt a disparity test based on a formula the Secretary had already rejected in 1976. 162 Rather, the Secretary's intent to include a weighted ranking in the equalization formula based on student population was imputed to Congress. 163 Moreover, New Mexico argued that the statutory scheme as a whole supports the Secretary's interpretation as illustrated by the fact that Impact Aid awards are calculated using a method which considers the pupil population of an LEA. 164 Finally, Petitioners' formula removed only ten LEAs for purposes of determining equalization. 165 According to New Mexico, the results of Petitioners' formula amounted to an insignificant portion of the student population and failed to completely eliminate anomalous outliers. 166 The Department of Education, as federal respondent, made an additional statutory construction argument in support of the Secretary's interpretation. The same Act through which Congress enacted Impact Aid also enacted the Education Finance Incentive Grant Program (EFIG To be sure, the language of the EFIG statute makes reference only to the body of the Impact Aid regulations, and makes no reference to the weighted ranking requirement included in the appendix of the regulations. 170 Nevertheless, the Department of Education considered the reference to Impact Aid regulations as encompassing the appendix, and argued that Congress could not be considered to have explicitly endorsed the Secretary's Impact Aid formula for EFIG, but implicitly prohibited it under the Impact Aid program.
171
B. The Court's Opinion
The Court's decision largely mirrored the arguments made by Respondents in their briefs and at oral argument, and focused primarily on whether discretion to choose an equalization formula had been delegated to the Department. 172 Writing for the majority, and joined by Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg and Alito, Justice Breyer employed a tortured interpretation of the Chevron review doctrine to decide that the Secretary's interpretation and methodology was both reasonable and within the scope of the Impact Aid statute's plain language. 173 The Court broke Chevron's rule requiring that analysis begin with whether 
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Congress has spoken directly to the question at issue through the statutory language.
174
Instead, the Court first considered the reasonableness of the Secretary's interpretation. 175 After considering the history and "basic purpose" of Impact Aid, 176 the Court noted that calculations for determining whether a state is "equalized" are the type of "highly technical, specialized interstitial matters" that Congress delegates to specialized agencies. 177 Second, the failure of any member of Congress to criticize the Secretary's methodology or suggest a revision illustrated historical support for the Secretary's interpretation. 178 Finally, the Secretary's formula was methodologically sound in ensuring the adequate elimination of outliers that may skew disparity determinations.
179
After establishing reasonableness, the Court addressed the plain language of the Impact Aid statute. 180 According to the Court, the phrase "above the 95th percentile . . . of . . . [per pupil] expenditures," when taken with "absolute literalness," limits the Secretary to calculation methods that involve "per-pupil expenditures." 181 The Court went on to explain that the word "percentile" refers to the distribution of "some population into 100 parts."
182
Although the statute mandated which relevant characteristic (per pupil expenditure) must be used to create cutoffs in that distribution, the statute did not specify which population is to be distributed. 183 This ambiguity was further highlighted by the fact that the statute concerns both students and school districts. 184 As such, the Secretary was free to define the population, in this case defining it by number of students instead of by number of LEAs. This grant of discretion to the Secretary was supported by the fact that Congress had avoided comparable ambiguity in other statutes by explicitly identifying the relevant population. The use of more general language in the Impact Aid statute gave the Secretary the "authority to resolve such subsidiary Justice Scalia penned a dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, and partially joined by Justice Souter, in which he characterized the majority's reasoning as the "elevation of judgedsupposed legislative intent over clear statutory text," made obvious by a majority opinion which begins with the second, instead of the first, step of Chevron review. 187 As an initial matter, the Secretary's implementing regulations did not resemble the Impact Aid statute, placing them at odds with the statutory language. Moreover, there was no ambiguity regarding which population is to be used for distribution, as the statute makes clear that LEAs are the only relevant population and "makes no mention of student population whatsoever."
188 Furthermore, the majority considered statutory context and erroneously concluded that Impact Aid is about both students and school districts. Rather, the Impact Aid statute focuses on LEAs instead of number of pupils, and includes an equalization formula designed to address funding disparities between LEAs, and not individual students.
189
Justice Scalia went on to note that the only thing about congressional intent that can be known for sure is that both Houses of Congress agreed upon the text of the statute.
190
In addition, Congress specifically incorporated student population into disparity determinations in other parts of the Act containing the Impact Aid statute. As such, Congress could have done the same thing with Impact Aid, and chose not to.
191
Justice Scalia further argued that by constructing a congressional intent that was not reflected in the legislative record, the majority not only unfairly expected schools to "pore over some 30 years of regulatory history to divine Congress's 'real' objective," but also "deprive [ Finally, Justice Scalia argued that the majority's concerns regarding outliers was unfounded, as parts of the statute specifically direct the Secretary to consider those aspects of state aid programs that consider the additional costs of providing education in unique districts.
194
Justice Souter wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which he conceded that Congress probably intended for the Secretary to continue to follow the disparity methodology devised prior to re-authorization of the Impact Aid statute. 195 Nevertheless, for the reasons explained in Justice Scalia's dissent, the language of the statute was unambiguous and in contradiction with the Secretary's methodology.
V. THE CONSTRAINTS OF CHEVRON REVIEW
Missing from the briefs submitted in the case, the oral arguments, and the Court's opinions, is detailed discussion about the effects of the equalization formulas on New Mexico public schoolchildren in terms of horizontal equity, vertical equity, or adequacy.
197 Briefs submitted to the Court neither assessed whether the Secretary's interpretation has detrimental effects on education finance in the two challenging districts, nor inquired whether the Secretary's formula potentially masks an unequalized education funding scheme. Both outcomes would be contrary to congressional intent in enacting Impact Aid.
Briefs also neglected to address the failure of the Secretary to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking after the changes to statutory language in 1994, 198 198. The Department maintains that it declined to engage in notice-and-comment procedures because the regulations were essentially a "re-issuance of regulations that had initially been promulgated in 1976, and those preexisting regulations were issued through notice-and-comment procedures." Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at 40. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 assertion that the interpretation allows for the most consistent determination of disparity from state to state. The fact that only three states, New Mexico, Kansas, and Alaska, even aspire to prove equalized funding for purposes of Impact Aid 199 begs the question of why the Secretary cannot make determinations of equality on a case-by-case basis, thus avoiding the problem of potentially masking funding inequalities.
Oral argument, which focused almost entirely on the doctrinal parameters of Chevron review, did not fare any better than the briefs. The hour largely mirrored briefs submitted in the case, and was limited to the question of whether Congress actually spoke to the precise question at issue, debates on what could be gleaned from legislative history, and the definition of the word "percentile." 200 The latter topic created mass confusion among the Justices. 201 The Court's majority and dissenting opinions continued the trend, analyzing congressional intent, and completely ignoring questions of equity.
The nearly exclusive focus on the purely doctrinal aspects of Chevron review in the case was overwhelmingly constraining. The parties' efforts to decide "who gets to decide" led to a complete failure to understand the policy implications of the formulas at the level where it counts-public school education in New Mexico. The constraints of Chevron review also eclipsed an opportunity for the Department to prove that its decision-making process was comprehensive, that it brought agency expertise to bear in making a decision, and that congressional goals were achieved through the Department's interpretation.
The narrow presentation of the case was particularly problematic as the Court proceeded to step two of Chevron analysis. Conflicting but equally plausible interpretations of the plain language and legislative history of the Impact Aid statute allowed the majority to determine that Congress did not speak directly to the question at issue. 202 203 At the second prong of review, the Court was tasked with determining whether the Secretary engaged in a "permissible" interpretation of the Impact Aid statute. Unable to glean a clear answer from legislative history or plain meaning of the statute, the determination of whether the interpretation was "permissible" should have involved an inquiry into whether the effects of the Secretary's interpretation were in line with congressional intent upon enacting Impact Aid. 204 Once there, however, the Court had insufficient information to properly determine whether the Secretary's decision-making process was thorough, and whether the Secretary's interpretation, in both theory and practice, furthered congressional intent.
A. Congressional Intent and Policy Implications
As discussed earlier, Chevron review strikes a balance between deference to congressional intent and deference to agency expertise in the policy arena. The Chevron court emphasized the latter when noting that "policy arguments are more properly addressed to legislators or administrators, not to judges." 205 Even when, however, Congress is deemed to have delegated policy decisions to agencies through ambiguous statutory language, the agency's policy decisions must still be reasonable in light of congressional intent; those policy decisions must be consistent with a statute's underlying purpose, 206 agency that produces consequences contrary to congressional intent can hardly be deemed a "permissible construction." Impact Aid was originally enacted to ensure that students educated in areas impacted by federal lands are not penalized by the inability of their school district to levy taxes against those lands, 209 and to provide support for the equalization efforts of the states. The statute was amended in 1974 with the intent of avoiding duplicative compensation to LEAs impacted by federal lands. 210 The statute accomplishes all three goals by providing aid to LEAs while also allowing states to consider the aid received by LEAs if the Secretary considers that state equalized.
211
True to its original purpose, Impact Aid goes to many school districts on or near American Indian reservations. The Aid often comprises significant portions of these school districts' budgets, 212 and helps the districts address unique learning challenges faced by Native American schoolchildren. When cuts to Impact Aid are made, school districts on or near tribal lands often suffer the most, prompting Senator Tom Daschle to note that cuts to Impact Aid make it "harder for Native Americans to receive [the] high quality education they deserve." 213 In the aftermath of Aid cuts, school districts like the Lapwai School District in Idaho, located within the Nez Perce Indian Reservation, have to choose between paying for extra academic programs that help students excel academically and making desperately needed capital improvements. 214. See Jernigan, supra note 212 (explaining that despite the success of reading programs that have brought significant percentages of students to grade level, the district must consider foregoing the programs to instead address building ventilation and mold problems that are causing illness in teachers and students). received in Impact Aid 215 has led to a "shortfall of support for some of the neediest public school students in the state." 216 Petitioners emphasize that educating Native American children in rural, isolated environments entails addressing special problems that stem from poverty, language differences and cultural differences. 217 219 Tutoring and other academic programs for which Impact Aid pays would help close the performance gap for these students. 220 Moreover, the districts' compromised taxing capacity has impeded their ability to fund capital improvements. New Mexico's capital outlay funding system, which has previously been declared unconstitutional due to a failure to abide by the state constitution's "uniformity clause," 221 is continually being monitored by a New Mexico District Court. Through the Public School Capital Outlay Act, the state evaluates the adequacy of facilities in each district and provides funding for facilities based upon relative need.
222
Wealthier districts with higher bonding and taxing capacities, however, are also able to approve additional local property levies, and issue general obligation bonds to independently raise additional resources for capital improvements. In addition, districts with political clout may be able to obtain direct legislative appropriations for capital outlay projects, as was the case Additional funding is also needed to provide housing and salary incentives for teachers in the two districts. 227 In Zuni, where districtprovided housing is often the only option for school employees who are not tribal members, teachers make do with trailer homes. 228 Educators living in the trailers have had to deal with raw sewage backing up into their homes, or deteriorated construction which in one trailer led to a toilet literally falling through the floor. 229 To compound hiring problems, New Mexico's education funding system makes additional payments to those districts that employ advanced-degree teachers. 230 But in districts like Zuni or Gallup-McKinley that depend on national programs like Teach for America to recruit recent college graduates to teach, rural isolation and poor conditions compromise the districts' ability to hire and retain highly-qualified teachers. 231 The result is that wealthier and more desirable districts easily retain their teachers and receive additional funding to support their higher salaries, while the impacted districts do not receive additional funding, but nevertheless have to pay higher salaries to attract instructors. Zuni Superintendent Kaye Peery notes that additional funding is desperately needed to attract and retain highlyqualified teachers for the rural district. Accordingly, the Secretary's formula may allow New Mexico to ignore not a problem of horizontal equity, but one of vertical equity and adequacy. New Mexico's funding formula does result in per-pupil expenditures that are equalized on paper. For the 2000 fiscal year, a perpupil revenue of $3320 placed Zuni at thirteenth in a ranking of districts throughout the state. 233 Although the first ranked Mosquero district still had approximately $3200 more in per-pupil revenues, Zuni's per-pupil expenditure for that year was just above the mean of $3192.08. 234 Nevertheless, the unique needs of impacted districts populated by Native American students warrant additional funding in order to successfully provide adequate educations that result in academic achievement.
Although New Mexico's funding formula does use cost differentials, the hardships suffered by both districts suggest that the formula fails to account for the districts' significant academic, recruiting, and facilities challenges. The funding formula does not, for example, account for the 330 housing units that Gallup-McKinley must provide for its teachers.
235
As one Zuni school board member said, "educating a student here is not the same as in Albuquerque. It takes a little bit more."
236 If both the Zuni and Gallup-McKinley districts had received Impact Aid for the 2005-06 school year without a corresponding decrease in their state equalization distributions, the districts would have received an additional $4.6 million and $15.6 million, respectively. 237 This would have allowed them to implement special academic support programs and make needed capital improvements. This additional funding would not be the "duplicative" compensation that Congress sought to prevent, but the supplemental funding needed by the districts to educate its students in a way that is comparable to other districts in the state with fewer special needs. Moreover, as admitted by New Mexico Education Secretary Veronica Garcia, the $50 million loss incurred by the state due to the inability to take credit for Impact Aid payments is insignificant, As has been illustrated, state aid which supplements a district's shallow tax base may fall far short of the amount needed to educate underachieving, isolated students in a district with deteriorating facilities. Accordingly, the Department of Education cannot use horizontal equity measures alone to accurately assess whether a state's funding system provides enough to meet the fair cost of adequately educating students with special needs. Yet, this is precisely what the Department of Education's equalization formula does. Technically referred to as a "restricted range ratio," 241 the Department's practice of comparing revenue at the ninety-fifth and fifth percentiles assesses the degree of horizontal equity. This is true whether percentile cut-offs are based on the number of LEAs or student population. As such, the formula fails to account for vertical equity or adequacy in New Mexico. 242 Arguably, the Secretary has little control over the equalization formula preferred by Congress. Congressional language mandates the restricted range ratio, and the Secretary cannot independently replace the ratio with a formula that takes better account of vertical equity. The Secretary can, however, consider the consequences of both versions of the restricted range ratio in light of congressional intent. Without the additional aid, Zuni and Gallup-McKinley are forced to address the very situation Congress intended to prevent: an inability to effectively address achievement gaps, maintain adequate facilities, or attract qualified teachers because of the presence of tax-exempt federal lands in the school district. This consequence suggests that use of the harder-to-meet equalization formula, which bases percentile cut-offs on the number of 239. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, State of New Mexico, Governor Richardson Releases Statement on New Revenue Estimates (Oct. 23, 2006), available at http:// www.governor.state.nm.us/press/2006/oct/102306_02.pdf (announcing an additional $576 million in recurring revenues will be available for the 2007 legislative session, $913 million is estimated to be available for capital outlay projects, and $142 million is estimated to be set aside for efforts to modernize schools across the State).
240. See Guzman, supra note 216 (discussing interview with New Mexico Education Secretary Veronica Garcia, in which she expressed that the issue is not the money but the questioning of "the philosophical foundation of [New Mexico's] funding formula").
241. See ALEXANDER & SALMON, supra note 8, at 235-36 (explaining that the federal range ratio used by the federal government in the Impact Aid program is mathematically equivalent to the restricted range ratio).
242. See, e.g., The National Association of Federally Impacted Schools, High Court to Rule on Equalization, Jan.-Feb., 2007, at 8, available at http://www.nafisdc.org/images/Jan-Feb%2007% 20Impact%20Newsletter.pdf ("[T]he current position held by the Department . . . does not insure that all children within a state receive a [sic] 'adequate education,' but rather only recognizes a form of spending per pupil that, although equalizes per-pupil spending as interpreted by the regulations, makes no attempt to insure students within a state are receiving an adequate education.").
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LEAs, might have been warranted. Such a choice is even more appropriate in light of plain statutory language that seems to require it. The constraining nature of Chevron review, however, led to the Court's failure to either consider the consequences of the Secretary's interpretation, or evaluate how those consequences informed the Secretary's decision. Accordingly, the Court was unable to accurately determine whether the Secretary's interpretation and ensuing choice of formula were in accordance with congressional intent.
B. Agency Expertise and the Department of Education
Ensuring the quality of primary and secondary education is a job historically left to state and local governments. Congress established the Department of Education in 1979 as a cabinet-level agency through the Department of Education Organization Act (DEOA). 243 Although one of the Department's seven stated purposes is to "supplement and complement the efforts of States" in improving the quality of education, 244 the Act specifically notes that the establishment of the Department did not "increase the authority of the Federal Government over education or diminish the responsibility for education which is reserved to the States and the local school systems." 253 a law that represented a dramatic departure from the federal government's traditional hands-off approach to state and local education, 254 evinces an effort on the part of federal lawmakers to avoid taking too heavy a hand in public school operations. NCLB does not impose any uniform federal student assessment measure upon the states, opting instead to require individual states to develop assessments and submit them for approval to the Department of Education.
255
This is not to say, however, that the federal government has played absolutely no role in ensuring quality education. To the contrary, the federal government administers hundreds of educational aid programs, including Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 256 -"the largest single federal investment in schooling."
257 Historically, the federal government has also supported the equalization of educational opportunities for students and has played a major policy role in the education of "insular and discrete" 258 student populations. 254. Historically, the federal government has preferred to suggest, and encourage states to adopt, voluntary reform goals. In contrast, NCLB is the first federal education program to impose requirements that students progress to a measure of proficiency within a certain time period.
255. Heise, supra note 252, at 141. The one aspect of the Act which imposes a test-the requirement for participation in the National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP) testing program-does not trigger consequences for a state or district's failure to participate. Id.
256. The Department of Education has, however, been criticized for its failure to issue guidelines governing the use of aid program funds, the lack of which has led to abuse. See McUsic, supra note 251, at 94 (discussing how lack of guidelines has led to disparate treatment of schools who need the funding the most).
257. Furthermore, the Department of Education serves as a "clearinghouse" for "ideas, facts and figures" related to the improvement of education, 260 monitors local education agencies, 261 and enforces federal antidiscrimination laws in federally funded educational institutions through the Department's Office of Civil Rights.
262
The Department of Education has also played a role in ensuring quality education for Native American students in particular. The Department maintains an Office of Indian Education, the mission of which "is to support the efforts of local educational agencies, Indian tribes and organizations, postsecondary institutions, and other entities to meet the unique educational and culturally related academic needs of American Indians . . . so that these students can achieve to the same challenging state standards as all students."
263 Moreover, the Department is familiar with the unique challenges faced by children living on Indian reservations, and has noted that "Impact Aid is often an extremely important source of revenue for school districts that serve children living on Indian reservations and other Indian lands, because these districts frequently have a very small local property tax base from which to raise revenue for schools." 264 Accordingly, the Department possesses considerable expertise that should have been brought to bear in considering the consequences of its application of the federal equalization formula. In particular, the Department 252 (referencing Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), a federal program that provides grants to states to assist with the "costs of providing special education and related services to children with disabilities"); id. at 227 (referencing Even Start, a federal grant program which supports local family literacy programs "that integrate early childhood education, adult literacy . . . parenting education, and interactive parent and child literacy activities for low-income families").
260 261. School accountability as maintained by the Department of Education, however, differs from accountability provided by other regulatory agencies. Paul Weckstein, co-director of the Center for Law and Education, has written about the dearth of accountability regarding federal programs that regulate local schools in the area of standards-based reform. Most teachers are not familiar with the substantive provisions of the federal programs that regulate their schools, and non-compliance is not considered outside the norm. In contrast, when FDA issues rules regarding medication, the norm is that doctors will become immediately aware of those rules, that there will be a high degree of compliance, and that the agency will be ready to take remedial action should it discover regulations have not been followed. should understand the methodological flaws inherent in the formula it uses to determine equalization among the states. The "restricted range ratio" 265 compares revenue at the ninety-fifth and fifth percentiles to assess the degree of horizontal equity in a state school system. The ratio, however, only measures two extreme points in a data set. As such, the restricted range ratio is a poor indicator for assessing the degree of equity in an entire education system, 266 and fails to provide information concerning the entire distribution of per-pupil revenues. As a result, the formula is limited in its ability to detect inequity in a school finance system, 267 and fails to consider the amount of vertical equity needed to provide adequate education for all students.
Although the Secretary cannot mandate the use of an alternate formula, the Secretary can use its understanding of the methodological flaws in the formulas, and the context of equalization in New Mexico, to make a decision about which formula to use. The Secretary is aware that once deemed equalized, a state is likely to reduce its funding to impacted districts by the amount of Aid received by those districts. The Department must also be aware that it is precisely those districts with compromised taxing capabilities that are most likely to be affected when a state exercises its option to offset Impact Aid. Moreover, it is foreseeable that impacted districts populated by Native American students are more likely to have special needs that warrant additional funding to ensure adequacy. In light of the context of equalization in New Mexico, and the knowledge that the formula which bases percentile cut-offs on student population is particularly problematic in New Mexico, the Secretary should have considered using the equalization formula which was harder for New Mexico to meet. The easier standard made it possible for New Mexico to qualify as an equalized state, but resulted in denying additional funding to those students who need it the most. Of course, it is possible that the Department considered the consequences of applying both versions of the equalization formula, and nevertheless decided that its formula was the best option. Neither submitted briefs nor transcripts of oral argument, however, illustrate that the Department considered the actual consequences of its formula on 
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impacted districts in New Mexico. There is also no indication that the Department evaluated whether its formula deemed New Mexico equalized at the expense of the population that Congress sought to protect through the enactment of Impact Aid. Furthermore, although determining disparity among school districts is inherently an exercise in statistics, the Department completely failed to consider statistical analysis issues in its interpretation. In his opinion, Justice Breyer took comfort in the fact that the Court's interpretation of the Impact Aid Statute, which mirrored the Department's interpretation, had not been challenged by any statistician. 
270
To support this assertion, Professor Gastwirth conducted an informal survey of twenty-seven professional statisticians. Among all twentyseven respondents, only two interpreted the Impact Aid statute in the same way as the Department of Education, and then only as a possible alternative interpretation assuming the number of pupils would be reported.
271
The overwhelming majority of statisticians surveyed In addition to highlighting that the Department's interpretation of the Impact Aid statute is out of step with the understanding of most professional statisticians, Professor Gastwirth also identified statistical infirmities with the Department's interpretation. Specifically, if one or both of the LEAs at the high and low end of the distribution contained at least five percent of the population, those LEAs would be the fifth or ninety-fifth percentile in the distribution, and would not be eliminated from disparity determinations.
273 Thus, despite the Department's desire to eliminate outliers, the Department's own interpretation can nevertheless fail to remove LEAs with anomalous characteristics. 274 Moreover, the Department incorrectly asserts that eliminating LEAs, without first considering pupil population, will necessarily disadvantage states with a small number of large school districts.
275
Such a disadvantage will only occur when there are at least twenty districts in a state, many of which must also be small.
276
Despite the presence of these statistical issues, the Department of Education neither used a statistician as an expert witness during the lower court proceedings, nor gave the Supreme Court any indication that it consulted statisticians for its interpretation of the Impact Aid statute. As perhaps an indication of the Department's failure to carefully work with the data it was given, Professor Gastwirth discovered an arithmetic error in the Department's analysis. 277 The Supreme Court has stated that the weight afforded administrative agencies "'will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, [and] the validity of its reasoning.'" 278 The Court has also stated that deference will depend on the "related expertise of the Id. Professor Gastwirth also draws attention to the methodological infirmities of the Impact Aid formula which apply to both Petitioners' and Respondents' interpretation of the statute. For example, the formula is based on an averaging process that reduces variation in the data, potentially masking a larger degree of variability in per-school inequality. Id. at 46. In addition, the practice of eliminating LEAs at the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles is not statistically sound for sets of data like per-pupil expenditure among LEAs, which are not "normal" or distributed symmetrically around a central value. Rather, the elimination of the fifth and ninety-fifth percentiles are more appropriate for data sets that are normal or distributed in a bell-shaped curve. Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute . . . and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time."
279 Here, the Department failed to consider the consequences of using a restricted range ratio, or to consult a statistician even though the question at issue involved statistics. Moreover, the Department provided unpersuasive justifications for its interpretation, and even committed arithmetic errors when manipulating the relevant data. These actions suggest careless and superficial consideration of issues that were central to properly assessing disparity in a state educational funding system. Accordingly, the Department's interpretation should have been given very little weight, if any at all. The doctrinal confines of Chevron review, however, constrained the Court's review of agency interpretation. The application of Chevron review did not encourage the Department to illustrate the extent to which agency expertise was brought to bear in the Department's decision. Nor did Chevron review encourage the Court to inquire. If the Court had inquired, it would have been clear that there was little agency expertise on the Department's part to actually consider.
C. A Solution: Resurrecting "Hard-Look" Review
The failure to consider the practical implications of the Secretary's interpretation, to determine whether congressional intent is being met, or to ensure whether the Department of Education spent sufficient time considering its interpretation of the Impact Aid statute is particularly problematic in light of the highly deferential second prong of Chevron review 280 and the unlikelihood that once there, the Court will find the Secretary's interpretation impermissible. 281 Automatic deference without consideration of the concerns invoked by the case led to a failure to 279. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002). 280. See Seidenfeld, supra note 202, at 96 ("Regardless of whether a reviewing court is deferential or active, once it reaches step two it rarely reverses an agency interpretation as unreasonable."); Gary Lawson, Outcome, Procedure and Process: Agency Duties of Explanation for Legal Conclusions, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 313, 314 (1996) ("Observers of modern administrative law know that most of the action in Chevron cases is focused on step one. If the reviewing court finds the relevant statute ambiguous, the agency's interpretation is almost always upheld at step two, with little discussion by the court."); Levin, supra note 117, at 1261 (finding that "in the thirteen years since Chevron, the Court has never once struck down an agency's interpretation by relying squarely on the second Chevron step").
281. See Levin, supra note 117, at 1270 (noting that generally, the Court grants certiorari in order to resolve clear-cut legal issues, and leaves to the lower courts responsibility for evaluating the manner in which agencies apply legal principles to fact situations. Accordingly, the Court is unlikely to take a case with the expectation of holding that the agency's interpretation passes step one of Chevron review but fails step two). KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
apply Impact Aid in its intended manner, to the detriment of New Mexico schoolchildren. The Court and the parties before it, however, could have been released from the constraints of traditional Chevron review and freed to consider these concerns if the Department was required to justify the validity of its statutory interpretation. By requiring the agency to address the policy implications of its interpretation, to illustrate that its interpretation would not result in consequences that clash with congressional intent, and to prove that its decision-making process was thorough, the Court could have avoided rubber-stamping an agency decision that warranted a more rigorous review.
Insisting that agencies justify their reasoning and policy decisions to a court is hardly a new idea. When reviewing informal agency rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) "arbitrary and capricious" standard, 282 courts have invoked a standard of review that extends deference to the agency but also mandates a "substantial inquiry" into the facts. 283 Although a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, and the agency's decision is entitled to a "presumption of regularity," 284 a substantial inquiry into whether the decision was made based on consideration of all relevant factors is still required. 285 In elaborating on this standard, the D.C. Circuit has written that close scrutiny of evidence, particularly in complex matters, is meant to educate the court, as the court must understand "enough about the problem confronting the agency to comprehend the meaning of the evidence relied upon and the evidence discarded; the questions addressed by the agency and those bypassed; the choices open to the agency and those made." 286 In this way, a court can determine whether the agency decision was "rational and based on consideration of the relevant factors." 287 
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The application of arbitrary and capricious review is not without challenge, and has been subject to critiques that it contributes to the "ossification" of informal rulemaking. 288 According to this critique, arbitrary and capricious review, particularly as performed in the D.C. Circuit, is both too intensive and too costly. 289 To pass the arbitrary and capricious review to which informal rules may be subject under the APA, an agency must explain its reasoning in excruciating detail, respond to every comment, and anticipate which issues will be of most concern to a reviewing court. 290 Moreover, even when agencies take these steps, there is only a 50% chance their process will pass review.
291 Faced with this daunting task, agencies have become reluctant to use the informal rulemaking process, despite the advantages of prior notice and public participation that informal rulemaking provides.
292
In response to the critiques, scholars and judges alike argue that the effects of arbitrary and capricious review do not warrant any changes in standard. Judge Wald has written that when applying arbitrary and capricious review, courts merely seek "to ensure that the agencies do what Congress has told them to do and that they exercise discretionary power in a reasonable fashion." 293 Additionally, Professor William S. Jordan has found that agency regulatory programs have continued despite failing arbitrary and capricious challenges, and that when rules were remanded under arbitrary and capricious review, agencies tended to recover quickly. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
Despite the on-going debate, "hard-look" 295 arbitrary and capricious review has long been thought to overlap substantially with the second step of Chevron review. Judge Laurence Silberman, a D.C. Circuit Court judge, first noted in 1988 that the second step of Chevron is "not all that different analytically from the APA's arbitrary and capricious review," and that both require a court to ask whether the agency considered and weighed the factors that Congress envisioned it would. 296 Since then, judges have noted the places in which the two doctrines converge and diverge. The D.C. Circuit, the tribunal that hears a significant number of challenges to agency action, 297 has issued a line of opinions that have highlighted the distinction between the two doctrines, including Arent v. Shalala.
298 Arent noted that although Chevron review and arbitrary and capricious review "overlap at the margins," the two doctrines ask different questions: step two of Chevron review asks "whether an agency has authority to act under a statute," while arbitrary and capricious review asks whether the discharge of that authority was reasonable." 299 Similarly, Texas Office of Public Utility Counsel v. FCC, 300 a Fifth Circuit case, has also drawn the distinction, noting that "'arbitrary and capricious' review under the APA differs from Chevron step two review because it focuses on the reasonability of the agency's decision-making processes rather than on the reasonability of its interpretation." 297. Levin, supra note 117, at 1256 (noting that the D.C. Circuit is the forum with the "greatest frontline responsibility for judicial review of agency action").
298 emphasis would be on the second step instead of the first, and would "[force] agencies to explain why their interpretations are good policy in light of the purposes and concerns underlying the statutory scheme" in question. 303 Professor Seidenfeld likens this revamped second prong to the D.C. Circuit's arbitrary and capricious "hard look" test, and envisions encouraging courts to require "agencies to identify those concerns that the statute addresses and explain how the agency's interpretation took those concerns into account."
304 Moreover, the agency would be forced to explain "why it emphasized certain interests" instead of others, and be required to address "contentions that its interpretation will have deleterious implications." 305 Going even further, Professor Ronald Levin has argued that while step one of Chevron review should encompass all traditional tools of statutory construction, 306 step two of Chevron review should be replaced entirely with arbitrary and capricious review.
307
Professor Levin characterized the second step of Chevron review as vague, 308 verging on internal incoherence, 309 and potentially redundant. 310 Replacing step two with arbitrary and capricious review would transform the second prong from being overly deferential to being a credible step in Chevron review that ensures an agency's decision "is not only consistent with congressional intent, but also socially responsible." 306. This includes textual and non-textual statutory interpretation, statutory structure and purpose, and legislative history.
307. Levin, supra note 117, at 1254. 308. See id. at 1260 ("The Court initially framed step two as a question of whether the agency's interpretation is 'permissible,' but that phrasing was circular: obviously an interpretation that is not permitted is prohibited, but on what grounds would the Court refuse to 'permit' an interpretation?").
309. See id. at 1260-61 ("Under the structure of the Chevron formula, a court should not reach step two unless it has already found during step one that the statute supports the government's interpretation or at least is ambiguous with respect to it. In other words, the agency's view is not clearly contrary to the meaning of the statute. If the court has made such a finding, one would think that the government's interpretation must be at least 'reasonable' in the court's eyes. Why, then, is the second step not superfluous?").
310. See id. at 1277 ("Chevron step two inquiry contributes nothing to judicial review that arbitrary and capricious review [in conjunction with Chevron step one review] does not already provide.").
311. Id. at 1262. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
deference to a Department of Labor opinion letter that was not promulgated subject to formal rulemaking procedures. 312 In Mead, a tariff classification ruling by the United States Customs Service was similarly denied deference because of the lack of formal procedures and the sheer volume of tariff classification rulings issued by the department; rulings "churned out at a rate of 10,000 a year at an agency's 46 scattered offices" simply could not have the force of law. 313 This was so, despite ambiguity in the relevant administering statute, and the authoritativeness of the agency's position regarding that ambiguity. 314 In FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 315 the Court denied deference to the FDA's assertion of jurisdiction over tobacco products because it involved a policy question that Congress could not have intended for the agency to address unilaterally. 316 Moreover, Barnhart v. Walton suggests that Chevron deference will not always be given uniformly, but will be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 317 Similarly, substitution of arbitrary and capricious review for the second prong of Chevron would deny agencies automatic deference in the face of statutory ambiguity, in an effort to require agencies to justify their decisions and encourage courts to perform nuanced and detailed reviews of the processes used to make those decisions. In the Zuni case, such a detailed look might have denied deference for an agency interpretation motivated by an arguably reasonable, if impractical in application, methodological intent. Nevertheless, the implementation of arbitrary and capricious review in the Chevron framework has significant benefits. Such an application would strengthen the overly deferential nature of the second prong, transforming it into a test which genuinely ensures that agency action is aligned with congressional intent. Moreover, it would remove the artificial distinction drawn between the legal interpretations usually associated with Chevron review, and the reasoned decision-making usually associated with arbitrary and capricious review. At the heart of arbitrary and capricious review is careful examination of an agency's reasoning process; an evaluation, therefore, of the conclusions an agency drew from its interpretation of a statute during its reasoning process is a necessary and integral part of arbitrary and capricious review. 318 Equating step two of Chevron review with arbitrary and capricious review would also deter a court's inclination to review the decisionmaking process employed by an agency without any regard to the policy consequences of that agency's decision. The questionable policy consequences of an agency's interpretation should be among the factors a court considers when reviewing the decision-making process.
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A decision with absurd, short-sighted, or nonsensical consequences necessarily calls into question the decision-making process, and should prompt the court to require an agency explanation addressing how such a decision resulted from a supposedly rational procedure.
D. Applying "Hard-Look" Review to Zuni
Although Respondents framed the issue as one of simple deference to the Department of Education's choice of methodology, Zuni involved the much broader topic of public school finance and how it affects equal access to educational opportunities. Unfortunately, traditional Chevron review constrained the parties' opportunities to educate the Court on the practical effects of the Secretary's formula, thus denying the Court an opportunity to make a proper determination of permissibility at step two of Chevron review. To be sure, wrangling during oral argument and in the briefs about the definition of the word "percentile" was important in identifying the intent behind the Impact Aid program, but that determination should not have been made in isolation from a review of the practical effects of a chosen definition. Moreover, there was scant evidence that the agency used its expertise regarding the academic challenges faced by Native American schoolchildren or the methodological weaknesses inherent in the equalization formulas at issue to make a decision in the case.
Replacing the highly deferential second prong of Chevron review with the "hard-look" of arbitrary and capricious review would have required the Justices to "steep themselves in agency policy and the substantive debate framing the issue," 320 and would have given the Department an opportunity to explain why its interpretation was good policy in light of the Impact Aid program's purpose. Levin's model provides the appropriate structure for such a change to Chevron review. At step one of Chevron review, the Court should use all tools of statutory interpretation to determine whether Congress has indeed spoken to the question at issue. In the Zuni case, tools of statutory interpretation did not yield a clear answer: the plain language did not address whether Congress intended for the Department to weight LEAs based on population when ranking those same LEAs in order of per-pupil expenditure; 322 legislative history could have been interpreted both for and against the agency; and review of the statutory scheme in which Impact Aid exists was inconclusive. As a result, the case should have gone to step two of Chevron review.
Arbitrary and capricious review at step two of Chevron review would have resulted in a more nuanced and holistic review of the Secretary's interpretation, starting with a review of process. Such a review would have asked why, for instance, the Department declined to engage in formal notice-and-comment procedures when the statutory language of Impact Aid changed in the 1994 re-authorization. The Court could have also required the Department to detail the alternatives that were considered. For instance, in light of the participation of just three states in the Impact Aid program, did the agency consider making equalization determinations on a case-by-case basis so as to avoid masking un-equalized funding schemes? Alternatively, instead of insisting that its interpretation was the only way to address outliers, could the Department have instead relied on § 7709(b)(2)(B)(ii) of the statute, which directed the Secretary to consider the costs of unique school districts in its equalization determinations?
Moreover, did the Department consider the potential inability of its own methodology to fail to remove district outliers?
Step two arbitrary and capricious review would have also encouraged the Court to consider the practical consequences of the Department's interpretation, and whether those consequences are in contrast to congressional intent underlying Impact Aid. What will be the effect of the Department's interpretation on educational funding for students in New Mexico? In direct contradiction to congressional intent, does the Secretary's interpretation negatively affect students impacted by a federal presence in their school district? Does the interpretation allow 322. Arguably, Congress did not have to speak to this question because it used language explicitly stating that LEAs are to be ranked based on per-pupil expenditure alone. In light, however, of the Secretary's use of weighted ranking prior to 1994, and because of the inconclusive results of legislative history and statutory construction review, a more nuanced review at step two is warranted.
a state to mask a funding system that is not genuinely equalized? In light of evidence that the answer to the last two questions is "yes," why did the Secretary insist on using the agency's easier-to-meet equalization standard?
Finally, arbitrary and capricious "hard-look" review at step two of Chevron review would have addressed the tension regarding agency expertise. Neither submitted briefs nor oral argument in the case suggested that the agency brought expertise regarding education of Native American schoolchildren, methodological flaws inherent in restricted range ratios, or statistical infirmities in the Department's own interpretation to bear in making a decision. 323 Not only would arbitrary and capricious review have allowed the Department to illustrate the extent to which its expertise informed the Secretary's interpretation, but the review would have also provided for the appropriate deference once that illustration was made. After all, arbitrary and capricious review does not allow a Court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency, but rather ensures that a decision was made based on consideration of all relevant factors required to make a decision that both falls within the agency's scope of authority, and heeds the original intent of Congress. 324 Although comedic, the quote illustrates that the Justices were not presented with sufficient information to properly determine at step two of Chevron review whether the Secretary's interpretation was made with the expertise that Congress intended the Department use, or whether the interpretation was in furtherance of congressional intent. To avoid this problem in the future, step two of Chevron review should be fortified with the standards of arbitrary and capricious review so that the Supreme Court itself, or a lower court on remand, can properly consider agency process, policy consequences, pursuit of congressional intent, and agency expertise when 323. The Department did not maintain specific expertise on its part but did argue that "[t]he uniform view of practitioners in the field of education finance . . . is that a disparity test like the one in the Impact Aid statute must take into account the number of pupils served by an LEA." Brief for the Federal Respondent, supra note 71, at 17. The Department did not elaborate, however, on whether such an application is reasonable if it eliminates twenty-five percent of LEAs in New Mexico.
324. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 200, at 11.
